I. INTRODUCTION In Duckworth v . Eagan,' the United States Supreme Court ruled that advising a suspect that counsel could only be appointed for him "if and when you go to court" does not render Miranda 2 warnings inadequate because the warnings in Duckworth reasonably conveyed to the suspect his rights. 3 This opinion is justified since the warnings in Duckworth accurately reflect the procedure employed in obtaining appointed counsel. Thus, criticism of the warnings should be directed at this procedure and not at the content of the warnings. In a concurring opinion, the Court also hinted that it would consider extending Stone v. Powell 4 to bar the relitigation in federal habeas corpus proceedings of nonconstitutional claims under Miranda. 5 This extension of Stone would be inappropriate since applying the reasoning in Stone to Miranda claims would not lead to the exclusion of those claims in habeas proceedings.
II. FACTS OF THE CASE
On the evening of May 16, 1982, GaryJames Eagan (hereinafter "Eagan") and some companions picked up a woman in South Chicago, Illinois. 6 They then joined a larger group and drove to a beach in Indiana along the Lake Michigan shoreline where the woman had sex with several men in this group. 7 Eagan and his com-panions then separated from the larger group apparently desiring to continue having sex with the victim, but the victim refused their advances. 8 A struggle ensued, and the victim was stabbed nine times. 9 Eagan then fled the scene of the crime and returned to his apartment in Chicago where he called a Chicago policeman to report that he had seen the naked body of a dead woman lying on a beach. 1 0 The policeman and his partner then met Eagan at his apartment, and Eagan led them to the location of the victim where they found her moaning and screaming for help."I Upon seeing Eagan, the victim exclaimed, "Why did you stab me? Why did you stab me?"' 12 Eagan denied stabbing the woman, claiming that he had discovered the woman while he was "there for a party."' 13 Later, upon ascertaining that the crime had been committed in Indiana, the Chicago Police turned over the investigation to the Hammond, Indiana Police Department.' 4 Hammond police detectives arrived at the scene of the crime on the morning of May 17, 1982, where they talked with Eagan. 15 He told the detectives that he had been attacked on the lakefront that evening, and that the woman had been abducted by several men. 16 Eagan then went to a local police station to fill out a battery claim. 17 Later, the detectives asked Eagan to come down to the Hammond police headquarters to make a statement and be questioned.' 8 Eagan agreed, and shortly after 11:00 that morning, the detectives questioned the petitioner about the incident. 19 Before questioning, Eagan was read the following warnings from a waiver form entitled "Voluntary Appearance; Advice of Rights." 20 The form stated:
Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights. You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in court. Eagan then signed the form and repeated his exculpatory explanation of his activities on that previous evening. 2 2 Eagan was subsequently placed in the "lock-up" in the basement of the Hammond police headquarters.
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Approximately twenty-nine hours later, the detectives again interviewed Eagan. 24 They advised him of his rights by reading to him a waiver of rights form which stated:
1. Before making this statement, I was advised that I have the right to remain silent and that anything I might say may or will be used against me in a court of law.
2. That I have the right to consult with an attorney of my own choice before saying anything, and that an attorney may be present while I am making any statement or throughout the course of any conversation with any police officer if I so choose.
3. That I can stop and request an attorney at any time during the course of the taking of any statement or during the course of any such conversation.
4. That in the course of any conversation I can refuse to answer any further questions and remain silent, thereby terminating the conversation.
5. That if I cannot hire an attorney, one will be provided for me.
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After reading and signing this form, Eagan confessed to stabbing the woman. 26 The next morning he led the detectives to the beach where the incident occurred. 2 7 There, the police recovered the knife used in the stabbing as well as several items of the victim's clothing. 28 Eagan was subsequently put on trial for rape and attempted murder.
clothing. 3 0 This motion was denied, and over an objection, the state court admitted all this evidence in a jury trial. 3 ' The jury found Eagan guilty of attempted murder, and he was sentenced to thirtyfive years imprisonment. Eagan appealed to the Indiana Supreme Court alleging that the trial court erred in admitting his statements as well as the physical evidence uncovered with his assistance because the, first waiver did not comply with the requirements of Miranda and thus was constitutionally defective. 3 3 The court upheld the conviction, stating that "the record supports the trial court's conclusion that [the] Defendant's first statement was voluntary, and therefore admissible." 3 4
One justice dissented, finding the warning containing the "if and when you go to court" phrase to be uncertain in that this phrase conditioned his right to an attorney on a possible future event, and in that the second set of warnings did not adequately clarify this uncertainty. 3 5 Eagan then sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, repeating the claims made in front of the Indiana Supreme Court.
3 6 The court denied the petition and held that the police adhered to the requirements of Miranda in taking Eagan's first and second statements. 3 7 Eagan then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 38 That court held that the warning containing the "if and when you go to court" phrase was "constitutionally defective because it denies an accused indigent a clear and unequivocal warning of the right to appointed counsel before any interrogation. ' 'if and when' language limits and conditions an indigent's right to counsel on a future event." 40 The court then held that the second set of warnings did not explicitly correct the confusion created by the first warning. 4 t The court therefore reversed the district court's order and remanded the case for a determination of whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to the presence of an attorney during the second interrogation.
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One judge dissented from this determination, stating that the majority's "formalistic, technical, and unrealistic application of Miranda has been soundly rejected by the vast majority of other circuits deciding the issue.... ."43 Furthermore, he determined that the first statement was given voluntarily, that the second set of warnings was constitutionally sufficient, and that the second statement was made voluntarily. 4 III. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, 48 initially noted that the Court granted certiorari in this case to "resolve a conflict among the lower courts as to whether informing a suspect that an attorney would be appointed for him 'if and when you go to court' way of furnishing you with an attorney, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court," were unclear and thus did not satisfy the requirements of Miranda)). 40 Id. at 1557. 41 Id. at 1558. 42 Id. This determination was not made by the court presumably because the majority believed that without the trial court transcript there was not a sufficient factual basis to find the second statement admissible. See Respondent's Brief at 34-36, Duckworth v The Chief Justice stated that Miranda warnings do not have to be given exactly as they are described in the Miranda decision. 55 As support for this proposition, several cases were cited in which references were made to possible equivalents of the warnings as stated in Miranda. 56 The Chief Justice next pointed out that the required warnings should be regarded as measures taken to protect the suspect's fifth amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination, and not as constitutionally protected rights in and of themselves.
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Reasoning from these points, the ChiefJustice asserted that the ex- Having established a standard by which to judge the validity of warnings, ChiefJustice Rehnquist proceeded to analyze the particular warnings in question. He first stated that the "warnings given to respondent touched all the bases required by Miranda," 60 and noted that Eagan was given every one of the required warnings. 6 ' The ChiefJustice then addressed the sentence in the warning which said, "[The police] have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court." The inclusion of this sentence was found to be valid for two reasons, both related to the legal accuracy of the statement.
First, the statement "accurately described the procedure for the appointment of counsel in Indiana." 6 2 Under Indiana law, indigents are appointed counsel at their initial court appearance. 63 Thus, the inclusion of the statement would correctly answer a possible question of a suspect. As the Court said, "We think it must be relatively commonplace for a suspect, after receiving Miranda warnings, to ask when he will obtain counsel. The 'if and when' advice simply anticipates that question." 64 Second, the statement is accurate in that Miranda does not require that appointed counsel be "producible on call" 6 5 or that "each police station must have a 'station house lawyer' present at all times to advise prisoners." 6 6 So, when an indigent suspect asks for a lawyer, the police are not required to provide counsel that instant. Rather, the police are merely required to cease their interrogation 58 Id. at 2880. 63 IND. CODE § 35-33-7-6 (1988). This appearance would be the suspect's arraignment since, under Indiana law, charges must be filed at or before that hearing. IND. CODE § 35-33-7-3(a) (1988) . Respondent suggested that this procedure was violative of his rights, arguing that "[iut is no answer to say.., that the instant warnings are acceptable because the police did nothing more than explain the Indiana procedure. An accurate description of a constitutionally deficient procedure does not make the procedure proper." Brief for Respondent at 35, Duckworth v where the Court stated in dicta that Miranda warnings would be defective if the reference to the right to appointed counsel was linked to a future point in time after the police interrogation. 69 ChiefJustice Rehnquist interpreted Prysock as meaning that any warnings that "would not apprise the accused of his right to have an attorney present if he chose to answer questions" would be defective. 70 The Chief Justice then concluded that, because the warning advised the suspect both of his right to the presence of counsel before any questioning and of his right to stop answering questions at any time, the warning, in its totality, 7 1 could not have suffered from this defect.
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In other words, it did not matter that a link was made between an indigent suspect's ability to obtain appointed counsel and a future event so long as a link was not made between that suspect's right to appointed counsel and a future event. Accordingly, the judgment of the Seventh Circuit was reversed.
B. THE CONCURRING OPINION
Justice O'Connor wrote a separate opinion in order to argue that the rationale of the Court's opinion in Stone 73 should be extended to bar relitigation of non-constitutional Miranda claims in federal habeas corpus proceedings. 7 4 The district court noted in its opinion that Eagan's claim may not be cognizable under Stone, but considered the claim anyway because the issue has not been resolved by the Supreme Court. 75 Justice O'Connor justified her treatment of this issue by claiming that the opinion is based upon the "equitable nature" of the writ of habeas corpus. Justice O'Connor's analysis began by noting that while eighteen state and federal judges considered respondent's Miranda claims, "None of these judges has intimated any doubt as to [Eagan's] guilt or the voluntariness or probative value of his confession." 7 7 She then asserted her view that society's interest in punishing criminals outweighs the marginal increase in police adherence to Miranda that results from exclusion of evidence on collateral review in federal habeas proceedings. 78 Thus, she concluded that "the federal courts' exercise of habeas jurisdiction in this case has served no one .... " 79 Justice O'Connor then discussed Stone and its applicability to this case. In Stone, the Supreme Court held that fourth amendment claims could not be litigated in federal habeas proceedings where the issue had been fully and fairly litigated in the state courts. 8 0 The Court reached this decision by weighing the costs and benefits in federal habeas proceedings of excluding evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment and deciding that the costs outweighed the benefits. 8 Justice O'Connor noted the costs of enforcing Miranda claims in federal habeas proceedings. Habeas proceedings offend principles of federalism by creating situations in which federal district courts sit in "review" of state supreme courts. 8 3 Furthermore, enforcing these claims is contrary to society's interest in punishing criminals because "[e]xcluding probative evidence years after trial, when a new trial may be a practical impossibility, will often result in the release of an admittedly guilty individual who may pose a threat to review] teaches not respect for the law, but casts the criminal system as a game, and sends the message that society is so unmoved by the violation of its own laws that it is willing to frustrate their enforcement for the smallest of returns." 8 5 Each of these costs outweigh whatJustice O'Connor regards as the minimal benefit of the exercise of federal habeas jurisdiction over Miranda claims, which is the slight increase in police adherence to the dictates of Miranda. 8 6 Therefore, Justice O'Connor would bar such claims from being relitigated through collateral review.
To support this view, Justice O'Connor made a distinction between constitutional and nonconstitutional Miranda claims. This was based upon the observation that "the Miranda rule 'sweeps more broadly than the fifth amendment itself' and 'may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment violation.' "8s7 Thus, assuming that a claim involves a violation of Miranda but not a violation of the fifth amendment-in other words, rights were knowingly and voluntarily waived, but the warnings given were defective-the petitioner's claim would be regarded as a nonconstitutional Miranda claim. This type of claim is theoretically not guilt-related since statements which are not the product of coercion are not presumptively unreliable. In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, Justice Marshall charged the majority opinion with "seriously mischaracterizing" the Miranda decision in order to reach its opinion. 89 Justice Marshall also expressed disagreement with the concurring opinion on the issue of extending the Stone rationale to cases concerning Miranda claims. 90 The dissent began with its own analysis of Miranda. While agreeing with the majority that "Miranda mandated no specific ver- Turning to the warnings in question, Justice Marshall agreed with the Seventh Circuit that advising Eagan of his right to the presence of counsel before and during questioning, and then telling him that appointed counsel could only be obtained if and when he went to court, could have led Eagan to believe that he did not have the right to an attorney before interrogation if he could not afford to hire one on his own. 94 Eagan may have believed that he was not entitled to an attorney until he went to trial, or if he was not taken to court, that he would not be entitled to an attorney at all. 9 5 Justice Marshall also argued that by parsing the questionable warnings in "lawyer-like" fashion, the majority ignored the fact that the warnings are most likely to be given to "frightened suspects unlettered in law, not legal experts schooled in interpreting legal or semantic nuance." '9 6 These people would be less likely to properly understand the warnings than would the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or other people with extensive legal training and experience. 97 Therefore, since the warnings in question can be easily misunderstood by laymen, they are defective.
Further, Justice Marshall argued that the warnings do not become valid merely because they accurately describe the Indiana procedure for obtaining appointed counsel. He pointed out that an accurate description of the procedure without a mention of the requirement that the suspect may only be held in custody for a reasonable period of time before he is charged creates "an effective means by which the police can pressure a suspect to speak without the presence of counsel." 98 Thus, he argued that by approving the warning because it does not misrepresent the Indiana procedure for 98 Id. at 2888 (Marshall, J., dissenting). However, a suspect must realize that he will not avoid imprisonment by talking, since if he confesses, he will surely be imprisoned.
obtaining appointed counsel, the Court is sanctioning an inherently coercive state practice. 9 9 Thus, mere procedural accuracy should not be a justification for approving a particular warning.
Justice Marshall then expressed his disagreement with the majority's interpretation of Prysock 100 and offered his own analysis of that case. Unlike the majority, Justice Marshall made no distinction between statements which link the right to counsel with a future event and statements which link the ability to obtain counsel with a future event. He found that Prysock condemned all warnings where references to appointed counsel are linked to a future point in time after police interrogation. Since the warning in question makes such a link, it falls into the category of warnings which were condemned in that decision.101
Justice Marshall then took issue with the reasoning in the concurring opinion. Justice Marshall argued that the rationale in Stone was based on considerations unique to fourth amendment claims and, therefore, this rationale cannot be extended to Miranda claims.' 0 2 On a broader level, Justice Marshall expressed his view that Stone was a wrongly decided case which should not be followed. 103 Justice Marshall then considered the reasoning employed in Stone and Justice O'Connor's weighing process and concluded that unlike the fourth amendment claims in Stone, the benefits of hearing Miranda claims on federal collateral review outweigh the costs. He first pointed out that while the evidence being excluded due to fourth amendment violations is physical in . nature and therefore both probative and reliable, 1 0 4 the evidence excluded due to Miranda violations is non-physical and presumptively unreliable. 1 05 He then asserted that whereas the exclusionary rule was established to deter police misconduct, 10 6 the rights secured by Miranda warnings "go to the heart of our accusitorial system"' 0 7 and were established to protect the suspect's right against coercive self-incrimination.1 0 8
Marshall thus weighed the benefits of preventing coercive self-incrimination against the costs of excluding presumptively unreliable evidence and found the benefits of federal habeas review of Miranda claims to outweigh its costs.
Finally, Justice Marshall finds the distinction between constitutional and nonconstitutional Miranda claims to be both incorrect and impractical. Since Miranda decided that no statement taken while in custody can be considered to be voluntary unless the suspect has been advised of his rights, all statements made without the warnings or made pursuant to defective warnings must be considered to be the product of coercion. 0 9 Therefore, there can be no nonconstitutional Miranda claim. 10 Furthermore, since federal district courts would have to examine all claims to determine whether they were constitutional or nonconstitutional, the practical benefits of excluding federal habeas jurisdiction would be lost."'
IV. ANALYSIS

A. CLARITY AND THE COERCIVE EFFECTS OF THE DUCKWORTH
WARNINGS
At the core of the controversy in Duckworth is a problem which arises when fulfilling the requirements established by Miranda. Miranda requires the police to advise the suspect that he has the right to the presence of counsel before and during any custodial interrogation, and that if he cannot afford such counsel, he may have an attorney appointed for him prior to being questioned. However, the right to presence of appointed counsel cannot be instantly exercised upon request for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court stated in Miranda that police stations need not have "station house lawyers" present at all times to advise suspects who are brought in for questioning.1 2 Second, only ajudge may determine whether or not the suspect is indigent, and thus eligible to have counsel appointed for him. 13 When a suspect requests appointed counsel, Miranda requires merely that the police refrain from questioning him at that time.114 In order to question the suspect, the police must commence adversarial proceedings. This requires an indictment and arraignment in court. The police are required by Miranda "1 5 and McNabb v. United States 1 6 to commence these proceedings "within a reasonable period of time" if they choose to keep the suspect in custody. During this period, the suspect will have to wait in jail until he appears in front of a judge who will determine whether he is entitled to appointed counsel. This wait may be several days.
The problem is that the suspect has the right to the presence of appointed counsel immediately after receiving the Miranda warnings and before he is questioned," 1 7 but the justice system does not provide any mechanism for appointing counsel until long after the suspect has been read his rights. The fact that the right to appointed counsel is temporarily ineffectual may give the indigent suspect the impression that the right does not exist at all.
The actual words used in traditional Miranda warnings make no mention of the delay in an indigent suspect's ability to speak with an attorney." l 8 The warnings containing the "if and when you go to court" phrase expressly inform the suspect of this delay.' 1 9 The issue before the Court was whether explicitly mentioning the fact that the exercise of the right to appointed counsel is subject to delay made the warnings so unclear as to be inadequate. 120 Prior to Duckworth, there was a split among the courts as to whether warnings containing the "if and when you go to court" caveat are clear under the standard set by Miranda. 12 The minority of courts found these warnings to be unclear. 12 This reasoning is sound in that warnings containing the "if and when you go to court" language are actually conveying a contradictory message. The suspect is told all at once of his right to speak with appointed counsel before any interrogation and of his inability to receive this counsel at the time that the warnings are being read to him. The problem with this reasoning is that although the message conveyed by the "if and when" language is contradictory, it is in fact true because the rights of indigent suspects, as interpreted by the courts, are themselves contradictory. 25 Also, asJustice Marshall noted, warnings containing the "if and when you go to court" phrase act as a coercive force on the suspect. 12 Keeping a suspect in custody until his first court appearance if he chooses not to speak is certainly coercion because suspects might feel compelled to answer questions in order to avoid this imprisonment. However, if the traditional Miranda warnings were given and the suspect asked for an appointed counsel, the police could then explain to the suspect that they will stop questioning him, but that they are going to lock him up until they decide to bring him to court. The courts could not recognize this as being a coercive situation as long as the lock-up was only for a reasonable period of time. Therefore, if this scenario will not be viewed as coercive, then a scenario in which the Duckworth warnings are read and the suspect understands his options without having to ask any questions also cannot be seen as coercive. Since the underlying situation is the same regardless of which warning is read to the suspect, the "if and when you go to court" language cannot be seriously considered to be coercive in and of itself.
Justice Marshall's opposition to the insertion of the "if and when you go to court" phrase into the traditional Miranda warnings is therefore misplaced. The coercion that he and others complain of is a result of the existing procedure for appointing counsel and not a result of warnings containing the "if and when you go to court" phrase. Indigent suspects will still be imprisoned when they request counsel regardless of which warnings are read to them. Therefore, ifJustice Marshall is unwilling to find the existing procedure for appointing counsel coercive, then he should not attack warnings which are merely an accurate reflection of this procedure. 1826, 1843 (1987) . Logically, these circumstances also include the suspect's lack of education and his/her fear or anger or both at being in police custody. 130 Justice Marshall stated that "[tihe threat of indefinite deferral of interrogation... constitutes an effective means by which the police can pressure a suspect to speak without the presence of counsel." Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2888 (Marshall, J., dissenting). But since he would not find Indiana's procedure for appointing counsel to be unconstitutional, this criticism rings hollow.
Courts approving the warnings in Duckworth have ignored the "if and when you go to court" phrase. Instead, they concentrated on the suspect's understanding of his/her rights to remain silent and to have counsel before and during questioning, and his/her understanding that the police must refrain from questioning him/her until counsel is appointed. This basic reasoning was relied upon in United States v. Lacy 131 where that court found the warning to be adequate because "the defendant was informed that (a) he had the right to the presence of an attorney and (b) that the right was to have an attorney 'before he uttered a syllable.' "132 The Lacy court then noted that the apparent linkage of the appointment of counsel to a future date "seems immaterial since Lacy was informed that he had the right to put off answering any questions until the time when he did have an appointed attorney."' 133 Other courts have used similar reasoning by holding that, when read in their entirety, the warnings adequately inform suspects of their rights. 13 4 Thus, all the courts approving this modified warning have relied upon the presence of other statements which advise the suspect of his right to appointed counsel, and his right to remain silent until this counsel is produced for him.
This reasoning has been subject to the criticism that, while these modified warnings are easily understandable to people who possess a sophisticated knowledge of law or logic, they may not be readily understandable to the uneducated and unsophisticated people who are most often subjected to police questioning. 13 courts, while approving the content of these warnings, have also recognized the .validity of this criticism. Two of these courts admonished police forces not to use these warnings. 13 6 Also, four of these courts explicitly recognized that, taken in isolation, the "if and when you go to court" phrase is confusing. 137 These criticisms suggest that the warnings in Duckworth cannot seriously be considered to be a more clear and unequivocal advisement of a suspect's rights than the original warnings stated in Miranda.1 3 8 This point is illustrated by an examination of the litigation involved in Duckworth. Seven of the eighteen judges ruling on this case found the warnings given to Eagan to be. ambiguous. This point is also supported by the existence of a split in the courts as to the clarity of these warnings. If judges cannot agree that warnings with the "if and when you go to court" phrase are clear, then it can hardly be argued that uneducated and unsophisticated indigent suspects could find them to be perfectly clear.
Perhaps it was for this reason that the Court in Duckworth did not find the warnings given to Eagan to be clear and unequivocal. Rather, the warnings were found valid merely because they reasonably conveyed to the suspect his rights. 139 It is here that this case could have its greatest impact on the analysis of Miranda warnings. The Chief Justice lowered the standard for clarity in Miranda warnings from the requirement that they must be "clear and unequivocal"' 140 to the requirement that they need'only reasonably convey to the suspect his rights.
14 1 In support of this change, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that a rigorous examination of the language used in the warnings is not necessary.' 4 2 The ChiefJustice concluded by holding that the warnings given to Eagan satisfied the requirements of Miranda in their totality.1 4 3 He never held that the warnings containing the "if and when you go to court" phrase were clear and unequivocal. This change can also be detected in what the Court left out of its opinion. First, the close proximity of the "if and when you go to court" language to the advisement of the right to the presence of counsel was never discussed even though it is the basis for the Seventh Circuit's rejection of the warnings. 1 4 4 Also, the majority never discussed the possible confusion that can arise from the use of the phrase "go to court." Justice Marshall pointed out that in common parlance, "going to court" means "going to trial,"' 145 and certainly the suspect is entitled to an attorney before that point. The failure of the Court to encourage absolute clarity in Miranda warnings indicates that the Court is not concerned with this issue.
As a result of the Duckworth decision, courts need only determine that the defendant cannot reasonably claim that he did not understand his rights based on the warnings given to him. In an amicus curiae brief, the United States argued that the validity of warnings should be decided on a case-by-case basis.
14 6 It would appear that in any future cases in which a defendant challenges the validity of a variation of a Miranda warning, the prosecution will have to prove that this variation was reasonable, and that it would be unreasonable to find that the defendant did not understand his rights. 147 Eagan argued that approving this change could lead to undesirable results since even Miranda warnings in their original form do not achieve the goal of giving suspects a clear understanding of their rights.
14 8 The Court ignored this argument since it serves to construing a will or defining the terms of an easement." 109 S. Ct. at 2880. It is worth noting, however, that this opinion left untouched the burden on the prosecution to show that a particular set of warnings are valid under Miranda. 143 157 Justice O'Connor's suggestion is derived from the concept that evidence should never be excluded through federal habeas proceedings where it is reliable and probative of the defendant's guilt. 158 The problem with recognizing non-guilt related claims is that since federal habeas proceedings always occur several years after the original trial, a new trial may be impossible, and thus habeas writs can set admittedly guilty criminals free. 159 Judges and legal scholars have recognized this as a problem with exclusionary rules.16 0 The argument that convicted defendants should not go free as a result of the application of the exclusionary rule in federal habeas proceedings was accepted in Stone. 16 174 The analysis in Stone could apply to all constitutional claims not related to guilt since there is no logical reason why it must be limited to the Mapp exclusionary rule. 1 7 5 Indeed, the Stone decision was called the "harbinger of future eviscerations" of federal habeas jurisdiction by Justice Brennan in his dissent in that case.1 76 Furthermore, Miranda and Mapp exclusionary rules are, at least superficially, similar. Neither rule is necessarily related to the guilt of the habeas petitioner. Since there can be a technical violation of Miranda without any violation of the fifth amendment prohibition of coerced testimony,1 7 7 it is possible for a Miranda claim to have no bearing on the question of guilt. 178 For these reasons, Justice O'Connor applied the weighing process used in Stone to determine whether or not to bar relitigation of Miranda claims on collateral review. She found the costs of interfering with society's interest in convicting and punishing criminals to outweigh the benefits that come from enforcing the judicially created, prophylactic safeguard of proper Miranda warnings through collateral review. 179 Thus, Justice O'Connor concluded that Miranda claims seeking suppression of probative evidence should not be cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings. 1 80 This would be a big mistake. The fact that the Stone weighing process can be used to determine whether or not to bar habeas review of Miranda claims does not mean that the results would be similar when that process was applied to both fourth amendment and Miranda claims. First, the types of evidence which are excluded by the Mapp and Miranda exclusionary rules are fundamentally different. Evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure tends to be physical, such as "a pistol, a packet of heroin, counterfeit money, or the body of a murder victim,"181 and is not rendered untrustworthy by the means of its seizure. 1 8 2 Thus, the application of Mapp excludes reliable evidence of guilt. On the other hand, evidence obtained as a result of a violation of a suspect's Miranda rights is presumptively unreliable. 18 3 This is because statements obtained as a result of such a violation are presumed to be coerced. 184 So, when a Miranda claim is raised, the petitioner is bringing into issue the integrity of the fact-finding process of the trial court by claiming that he was convicted with unreliable evidence. 185 Therefore, while the exclusion of probative evidence through the Mapp exclusionary rule interferes with the fact-finding process, the exclusion of unreliable evidence through Miranda actually enhances the fact-finding process.
Second, while the Mapp exclusionary rule supposedly exists only for the deterrence of police misconduct, the Miranda rules primarily exist not only to deter police misconduct, but to "protect a criminal suspect's exercise of the privilege [against self-incrimination] which is one of the distinctive components of our criminal law."'1 8 6 As the Court stated in Miranda, "The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is fundamental with respect to the Fifth ance in opinions and more opportunity for the federal courts to "overrule" state courts.' Thus, tension between federal and state courts would be heightened and not reduced. Justice O'Connor's problems with federal district courts overruling state supreme courts is thus with the existence of federal habeas jurisdiction in general, and not with this particular application of it.
V. CONCLUSION
As a result of Duckworth, Miranda warnings containing a sentence which says that the suspect can only obtain appointed counsel "if and when he goes to court" is valid because warnings containing this phrase "reasonably convey" to a suspect his/her rights. This decision lowers the standard of clarity required of Miranda warnings. While lowering the standard for clarity is not desirable in light of the fact that Miranda warnings are not adequately understood by suspects in their traditional form, the Duckworth ruling made sense in that the Duckworth warnings accurately describe the procedure for obtaining appointed counsel. Since a suspect requesting appointed counsel would be told by the police that he/she will not receive such counsel until he/she goes to court, it does not make sense to say that because the warnings serve to advise the suspect of this fact, they are invalid. If these warnings seem coercive, it is because the procedure is coercive, and if this is troublesome, the procedure for appointing counsel should be changed and not the application of the warnings.
Justice O'Connor signalled that the Supreme Court would consider extending Stone v. Powell to bar claims of technical violations of Miranda from being cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings. While the weighing process used in Stone may be used to analyze this contention, the results reached from such a process lead to the conclusion that Miranda claims should remain cognizable in federal habeas proceedings. This is because the costs and benefits of applying the Mapp exclusionary rule differ dramatically from the those of the Miranda exclusionary rule. Therefore, Stone should not be extended to cover either technical Miranda claims in particular or fifth amendment claims in general. DAVID B. ALTMAN
